
S E C R E E



17 January 1969

MISSION NUMBER C-019-C

II. FACTS

7. Security:

comprehensive Security review at Detachment H was undertaken on 9, 10, 11 and 12 January 1969 25X1A9a Project Headquarters Security Staff Member of the Accident Investigation Team. The Security investigation embraced the period 30 December 1968 to 5 January 1969 and explored unit pre-mission procedures and compound personnel activities in support of the 25X1C8c and Aircraft (Article 385) prior to and at mission launch on 5 January. Although all areas of personnel, physical and operational security received thorough consideration, the investigation was specifically addressed to the matter of sabotage as a possible cause of this loss and in this context all team members were consulted on findings where Security factors are pertinent.

Due to loss of Article 385 on 5 January 1969, a

25X1C8a

B. The investigation team inquiries didn't extend to beyond the Detachment H compound areas; therefore, investigation must be considered an internal unit matter; however, no evidence existed to warrant security extension of investigation beyond current limits although tracking25X1D2a occurred, prior awareness evidence has not been disclosed.

C. Security office activity logs (Attachment A & B) covering time frame 0001L, 30 December 1968 to 2400L, 5 January 1969 were examined without evidence to suggest unusual activities or incidents within the mission areas by American or personnel before launch time 05/0030Z.

25X1C8a

Approved For Release 2000/08/21: CIA-RDP33-02415A000300180033-2

Page 2

- D. Security activity logs for pre-mission alert period reveals that aircraft 385 was under continuing surveillance by Detachment Security Assistants with no irregularities being reported.* Although aircraft had not been flown since 30 December 1968, no evidence uncovered to reveal tampering from that time until mission date.
- E. As reported in Section 5 and by affidavits, pilot was functioning in a project controlled . 25X1C8a environment from 2000 local, 4 January 1969, with no irregularities or unusual events to suggest compromise of mission pilot from Security view-point. Food consumed by pilot at mess is 25X1C8a established by Flight Surgeon affidavit. Samples were confiscated by direction of Security after loss reported and forwarded to U. S. military lab for analysis. Results of analysis still pending.

25X1A6a

- F. Fuel samples confiscated by direction of Security.

 (See Attachment D.) Samples taken from sump
 tank and fuel nozzle during mission aircraft
 fueling sequence. Results pending analysis.

 Samples also taken from tanker sent to lab
 and Wright-Pat; analysis pending.
- G. Oxygen samples confiscated by direction of Security (see Attachment D). Samples taken from pre-breathing room, Van transfer bottle and mission aircraft. Results received indicate oxygen in mission aircraft favorably analyzed but samples from pre-breathing room and transfer bottle not acceptable under analysis. Another sample sent for further analysis, results pending.
- H. Personal private interviews were accomplished by Security investigator with representatives from all sections participating in pilot and mission aircraft alert sequence for 24-hour period preceding launch. No irregularities were reported. Personnel behavior and pattern of pre-mission activities not considered unusual or contributing

*Attachments A, B and C

Approved For Release 2000/08/21 : CIA-RDP33-024154000300180033-2

Page 3

factors to loss. However, the long term intimate social indigenous contacts of our personnel cannot be ignored as a channel for exploitation.

25X1C8a

I. Investigation disclosed wide lack of knowledge by most Detachment personnel as to occurrences or activities within channels during alert sequence. However, "Need-to-Know" criteria and internal policy prerogative considerations govern access to matters within their channels.

25X1C8a

- J. The Security Representative of the Accident Investigating Board conducted a visual and physical review of the Detachment areas resulting in a favorable judgment of the existing physical and personnel security program. An effective defensive posture exists to preclude unauthorized access.
- K. Pre-mission operational security procedures were also reviewed and are considered sound and in accordance with Headquarters policies. (Att. C)
- L. The Security Representative inspected the mission aircraft fuel storage area which is located adjacent to the North East compound entrance within a fenced perimeter. This area is under 24-hour visual surveillance by security guards. No irregularities were observed.

25X1C8a

M. It is Security opinion that Survival Beacon Procedures should be reviewed in the light of missions over international waters.

25X1C8a

N. Matter of US and SAR procedures should also be reviewed since SAR plan is unknown and USAF SAR obviously in need of additional details surrounding emergency, i. e., nationality of pilot, type aircraft, nature of survival equipment, color of raft, etc.

25X1C8a

Approved For Release 2000/08/21 : CIA-RDP33-024154000300180033-2

Page 4

IV. CONCLUSION:

- 1. No evidence of sabotage was uncovered associated with pilot or mission aircraft in the pre-mission alert period. However, final judgment is reserved pending outcome of food, oxygen and fuel samples analysis.
- 2. The question of an external threat as a possible cause of loss is not supported by evidence and the long term concern for prior awareness is obviously not an issue in Mission C-019-C fact situation.

25X1D0g

25X1D0g

3. No significant discrepancy or unexplained events noted in Detachment mission generation activities from mission alert to aircraft launch. Pilot and aircraft were unanimously reported as being normal. Mission generation is a team effort with no one individual possessing unbridled access. System of inspections, certifications and observations collectively minimize opportunity for unreported discrepancies or damage to pilot or mission configuration vehicle. Pre-flight checkout of pilot and aircraft serves as check and balance against intentional or inadvertent damage being unnoticed.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

- 1. That food samples be obtained when pilot is actually consuming food and then turned over to Security Staff for control purposes in event of contingency situation.
- 2. Although no evidence or facts exist to sustain belief of safe landing by pilot; nevertheless, quick recovery of downed pilot would be enhanced by revision of current procedures to allow use of automatic survival beacon activation in international waters in lieu of manual activation required by current policy.
- 3. Recommend improvement in SAR liaison procedures to insure information needed for rescue purposes reaches appropriate levels. Necessary information could be made available without classified disclosures.

25X1C8a

4. Recommend SAR contingency plan be available at Detachment "H" to insure separate efforts known to American and sides. 25X1C8a

Approved For Release 2000/08/21: CIA-RDP33-024154900300180033-2

Page 5

25X1D0g

- 5. Recommend that additional insight be gained regarding handling of alert details when transferred to 25X1C8a channels. This knowldge is necessary to any investigation where question of sabotage is related by evidence of threat or attack. Fortunately, did not have a bearing in this event. 25X1D0g
- 6. Recommend a reindoctrination program of all Detachment personnel re-emphasizing security/cover obligations and special reference to dangers posed by long term intimate non-project indigenous relationships.